as america continued to urbanize and grow in population, what part of their view of nature changed?

Facts Views Vis Obgyn. 2022; 5(4): 281–291.

The world population explosion: causes, backgrounds and projections for the future

J. Van Bavel

Centre for Sociological Enquiry / Family unit & Population Studies (FaPOS), Kinesthesia of Social Sciences, Academy of Leuven, Parkstraat 45 bus 3601, 3000 Leuven, Kingdom of belgium.

Abstract

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the total world population crossed the threshold of one billion people for the first fourth dimension in the history of the homo sapiens sapiens. Since then, growth rates have been increasing exponentially, reaching staggeringly high peaks in the 20th century and slowing down a bit thereafter. Total world population reached 7 billion just after 2022 and is expected to count ix billion past 2045. This newspaper commencement charts the differences in population growth between the world regions. Side by side, the mechanisms behind unprecedented population growth are explained and plausible scenarios for future developments are discussed. Crucial for the long term trend will be the rate of decline of the number of births per woman, called total fertility. Improvements in teaching, reproductive wellness and child survival will exist needed to speed upwardly the decline of full fertility, specially in Africa. But in all scenarios, world population volition continue to grow for some time due to population momentum. Finally, the paper outlines the contend about the consequences of the population explosion, involving poverty and nutrient security, the impact on the natural surroundings, and migration flows.

Key words: Fertility, family planning, world population, population growth, demographic transition, urbanization, population momentum, population projections.

Keywords: Fertility, family planning, world population, population growth, demographic transition, urbanization, population momentum, population projections

Introduction

In the year 1900, Belgium and the Philippines had more than or less the aforementioned population, around 7 million people. Past the year 2000, the population of the Western European monarchy had grown to ten million citizens, while the S East Asian democracy at the turn of the century already counted 76 million citizens. The population of Kingdom of belgium has since then exceeded 11 million citizens, simply it is unlikely that this number will rise to 12 million by the year 2050. The population of the Philippines on the other mitt will continue to grow to a staggering 127 one thousand thousand citizens past 2050, according to the demographic projections of the United Nations (United nations 2022).

The demographic growth rate of the Philippines around the plow of the century (ii% a year) has already created enormous challenges and is conspicuously unsustainable in the long term: such growth implies a doubling of the population every 35 years as a consequence of which in that location would be 152 1000000 people by 2035, 304 one thousand thousand by 2070, and then on. Nobody expects such a growth to actually occur. This contribution will discuss the more realistic scenarios for the hereafter.

Even the rather small Belgian demographic growth rate around the turn of this century (0.46%) is non sustainable in the long term. In whatsoever case, information technology exceeds by far the boilerplate growth rate of the homo species (human sapiens sapiens) that arose in Africa some 200.000 years ago. Today, earth is inhabited past some vii billion people. To attain this number in 200.000 years, the average yearly growth charge per unit over this term should have been around 0.011% annually (and then 11 extra man beings per 1.000 human beings already living on earth). The current Belgian growth rate would imply that our state would accept grown to 7 billion in less than 1500 years.

The indicate of this story is that the current growth numbers are historically very exceptional and untenable in the long term. The demographic growth rates are indeed on the decline worldwide and this paper will attempt to explain some of the mechanisms behind that process. That doesn't change the fact, even so, that the growth remains extraordinarily high and the reject in some regions very ho-hum. This is especially the case in Sub Saharan Africa. In accented numbers, the world population volition go along to grow anyway for quite some fourth dimension equally a issue of demographic inertia. This too volition be further antiseptic in this newspaper.

The development of the world population in numbers

In order to be sustainable, the long term growth rate of the population should not differ much from 0%. That is because a growth rate exceeding 0% has exponential implications. In simple terms: if a combination of birth and growth figures simply appears to cause a modest population growth initially, then this seems to imply an explosive growth in the longer term.

Thomas R. Malthus already acquired this signal of view by the terminate of the 18th century. In his famous "Essay on the Principle of Population" (offset edition in 1789), Malthus argues justly that in time the growth of the population volition inevitably tiresome down, either by an increment of the death rate or by a subtract of the nativity rate. On a local calibration, migration likewise plays an important role.

Information technology is no coincidence that Malthus' essay appeared in England at the end of the 18th century. After all, the population there had started to grow at a historically unseen rate. More specifically the proletariat had grown immensely and that worried the intellectuals and the elite. Year after year, new demographic growth records were recorded.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the number of i billion people was exceeded for the starting time time in history. Later growth accelerated and the number of two billion people was already surpassed effectually 1920. Past 1960, some other billion had been added, in 40 instead of 120 years time. And it continued to go even faster: 4 billion by 1974, 5 billion by 1987, six billion by 1999 and seven billion in 2022 (Fig. one).

Historical growth of the world population since twelvemonth 0

This will certainly not stop at the current 7 billion. According to the nearly recent projections by the Un, the number of 8 billion will probably exist exceeded by 2025, and around 2045 at that place volition be more than nine billion people¹. The further ane looks into the future, the more than uncertain these figures become, and with demography on a earth scale ane must ever take into account a margin of error of a couple of tens of millions. But according to all plausible scenarios, the number of 9 billion will exist exceeded by 2050.

Demographic growth was and is not equally distributed effectually the globe. The population explosion first occurred on a pocket-size scale and with a relatively moderate intensity in Europe and America, more or less betwixt 1750 and 1950. From 1950 on, a much more substantial and intensive population explosion started to accept identify in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Fig. two). Asia already represented over 55% of the earth population in 1950 with its 1.iv billion citizens and by the year 2022 this had increased to iv.two billion people or threescore%. Of those people, more than 1.iii billion live in China and 1.2 billion in Bharat, together accounting for more than one third of the globe population.

Evolution of the population size by continent, 1950-2050*.

In the future, the proportion of Asia will come down and that of Africa will increment. Africa was populated by some 230 meg people around 1950, or nine% of the world population. In 2022 there were already more than one billion Africans or 15% of the globe population. According to United nations projections, Africa will continue to grow at a spectacular charge per unit up to 2.ii billion inhabitants in 2050 or 24% of the globe population. The proportion of Europe, on the other manus, is evolving in the opposite direction: from 22% of the world population in 1950, over 11% in 2022 to an expected mere 8% in 2050. The population of Latin America has grown and is growing chop-chop in accented terms, but because of the strong growth in Asia and specially Africa, the relative proportion of the Latin American population is hardly increasing (at nigh from 6 to 8%). The proportion of the population in N America, finally, has decreased slightly from seven to v% of the earth population.

What these figures mainly come up down to in practice is that the population size in particularly the poor countries is increasing at an unprecedented rate. At the moment, more than 5.7 billion people, or more than 80% of humanity, are living in what the UN categorise as a developing country. Past 2050, that number would – according to the projections – accept increased to eight billion people or 86% of the globe population. Within this group of developing countries, the group of to the lowest degree developed countries, the poorest countries so to speak, is growing strongly: from 830 million now, upwardly to an expected 1.seven billion in 2050. This comprises very poor countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Niger or Togo in Africa; Afghanistan, People's republic of bangladesh or Myanmar in Asia; and Haiti in the Caribbean.

The growth of the world population goes hand in mitt with global urbanisation: while around the year 1950 less than 30% of people lived in the cities, this proportion has increased to more than than fifty%. Information technology is expected that this proportion will continue to grow to two thirds around 2050. Latin America is the well-nigh urbanised continent (84%), closely followed by Northward America (82%) and at a distance by Europe (73%). The population density has increased intensely particularly in the poorest countries: from 9 people per foursquare km in 1950 to 40 people per square km in 2022 (an increment by 330%) in the poorest countries, while this figure in the rich countries increased from 15 to 23 people per square km (a 50% growth). In Belgium, population density is 358 people per foursquare km and in kingdom of the netherlands 400 people per square km; in Rwanda this number is 411, in the Palestinian regions 666 and in Bangladesh an astonishing 1050.

Although the world population volition continue to grow in absolute figures for some time – a following paragraph will explicate why – the growth rate in percentages in all large world regions is decreasing. In the richer countries, the yearly growth rate has already declined to beneath 0.3%. On a global scale, the yearly growth rate of more than 2% at the peak effectually 1965 decreased to around 1% now. A further decline to less than 0.5% by 2050 is expected. In the world'south poorest countries, the demographic growth is all the same largest: at present around 2.2%. For these countries, a considerable decrease is expected, but the projected growth rate would not autumn beneath 1.5% before 2050. This ways, as mentioned in a higher place, a massive growth of the population in accented figures in the globe'southward poorest countries.

Causes of the explosion: the demographic transition

The cause of, starting time, the acceleration and, and then, the deceleration in population growth is the modern demographic transition: an increasingly growing group of countries has experienced a transition from relatively high to depression nascency and death rates, or is nonetheless in the process of experiencing this. Information technology is this transition that is causing the modern population explosion. Effigy iii is a schematic and strongly simplified representation of the modernistic demographic transition.

Schematic representation of the modern demographic transition.

In Europe, the mod demographic transition started to accept place in the middle of the 18th century. Until then, years of extremely high death rates were quite frequent. Extremely loftier crisis mortality could be the consequence of epidemic diseases or failed harvests and famine, or a combination of both. Equally a consequence of better hygiene and a better transportation infrastructure (for one, the canals and roads constructed by Austria in the 18th century), amongst other reasons, crunch mortality became less and less frequent. Later on on in the 19th century, child survival began to improve. Vaccination against smallpox for example led to an eradication of the illness, with the last European smallpox pandemic dating from 1871. This way, not only the years of crisis mortality became less frequent, but also the average decease charge per unit decreased, from an average 30 deaths per 1000 inhabitants in the first of the 19th century to effectually 15 deaths per 1000 citizens by the kickoff of the 20th century. In the concurrently, the birth rate all the same stayed at its previous, high level of xxx-35 births per chiliad inhabitants.

The death charge per unit went downward only the birth rate still didn't: this acquired a large growth in population. It was only near the end of the nineteenth century (a bit earlier in some countries, later on in others) that married couples in large numbers started to reduce their number of children. By the middle of the 20th century, the middle class ideal of a two children household had gained enormous popularity and influence. The reaction by the Church, for example in the encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), came much too late to bring this evolution to a halt.

As a event of widespread family unit planning – made even easier in the sixties by modern hormonal contraceptives – the birth rate started declining as well and the population tended back towards zilch growth. Nowadays the end of this transition process has been more than than achieved in all European countries, because the fertility has been beneath replacement level for several decades (the replacement level is the fertility level that would in the long term atomic number 82 to a nativity rate identical to the death rate, if at that place would be no migration)².

That the population explosion in the developing countries since the second half of the 20th century was so much more intense and massive, is a outcome of the fact that in those countries, the process of demographic transition occurred to a much more farthermost extent and on a much larger scale. On the one hand, mortality decreased faster than in Europe. After all, in Europe the decline in mortality was the effect of a gradual understanding of the importance of hygiene and subsequently the development of new medical insights. These insights of course already existed at the start of the demographic transitions in Asian, Latin American and African regions, whereby the life expectancy in these regions could grow faster. On the other hand, the total fertility – the average number of children per woman – at the first of the transition was a lot higher in many poor regions than it initially was in Europe. For S Korea, Brasil and the Congo, for example, the total fertility rate shortly after the Second World War (at the outset of their demographic transition) is estimated to be 6 children per woman. In Belgium this number was close to iv.5 children per woman past the middle of the nineteenth century. In some developing regions, the fertility and birth rate decreased moderately to very fast, but in other regions this decline took off at an exceptionally sluggish pace – this will be further explained afterward on. Equally a consequence of these combinations of factors, in most of these countries the population explosion was much larger than it had been in most European countries.

Scenarios for the future

Nonetheless, the process of demographic transition has reached its second stage in almost all countries in the world, namely the phase of failing fertility and birth rates. In a lot of Asian and Latin American countries, the entire transition has taken place and the fertility level is around or below the replacement level. Republic of korea for example is currently at 1.2 children per woman and is one of the countries with the everyman fertility levels in the world. In Iran and Brasil the fertility level is currently more or less equal to Kingdom of belgium'southward, that is ane.8 to ane.9 children per woman.

Crucial to the future evolution of the population is the farther development of the birth rate. Scenarios for the futurity evolution of the size and age of the population differ co-ordinate to the hypotheses apropos the further evolution of the birth charge per unit. The evolution of the birth rate is in turn dependent on 2 things: the further evolution of the full fertility charge per unit (the average number of children per woman) in the first place and population momentum in the second. The latter is a concept I will later on discuss in more particular. The role of the population momentum is usually overlooked in the pop debates, merely is of utmost importance in agreement the farther evolution of the earth population. Population momentum is the reason why nosotros are as good as sure that the earth population volition proceed to grow for a while. The other factor, the evolution of the fertility rate, is much more uncertain simply of disquisitional importance in the long term. The rate at which the farther growth of the world population can be slowed down is primarily dependent on the extent to which the fertility rates will go on to pass up. I will further elaborate on this notion in the adjacent paragraph. Later on that, I will clarify the notion of population momentum.

Declining fertility

Fertility is going downwardly everywhere in the world, simply it's going down particularly slowly in Africa. A further decline remains uncertain there. Effigy 4 shows the development per earth region between 1950 and 2022, plus the projected development until 2050. The numbers before 2022 illustrate 3 things. First of all, on all continents there is a turn down going on. Secondly, this decline is not equal everywhere. And thirdly: the differences between the continents remain big in some cases. Asia and Latin America take seen a similar decline in fertility: from 5.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.five at the offset of the 21st century. Europe and Due north America had already gone through the largest part of their demographic transition by the 1950's. Their fertility level has been below replacement levels for years. Africa has indeed seen a global decrease of fertility, but the boilerplate number of children is withal at an alarmingly loftier level: the fertility merely decreased from vi.7 to 5.1 children per adult female.

Evolution of the total fertility charge per unit by world region: 1950-2050

These continental averages hide a huge underlying diversity in fertility paths. Figure 5 attempts to illustrate this for a number of countries. Firstly permit us consider two African countries: the Congo and Niger. As was often the case in Europe in the 19th century, fertility was first on the rising before it started failing. In the Congo this decrease was more extensive, from around six children in 1980 to 4 children per woman today, and a further decline to just below iii is expected in the next thirty years. Niger is the state where the fertility level remains highest: from 7 it first rose to an average of just below 8 children per woman in the middle of the 1980's, earlier decreasing to just to a higher place 6.v today. For the next decades a refuse to 4 children per woman is expected. Merely that is non at all certain: it is dependent on circumstances that will be farther explained in a moment. The demographic transition is subsequently all not a police force of nature but the upshot of man actions and human institutions.

Development of the total fertility rate in some countries betwixt 1950 and 2022, and projected evolution until 2050.

Around 1950, Islamic republic of pakistan and Islamic republic of iran had more than or less the aforementioned fertility level as Niger, but both countries have seen a considerable decline in the meantime. In Pakistan the level decreased slowly to the current level of iii children per adult female. In Iran the fertility decreased more abruptly, faster and deeper to below the replacement level – Iran today has one of the lowest fertility levels in the world, and a farther turn down is expected. The Iranian Revolution of 1978 played a crucial role in the history of Islamic republic of iran (Abassi-Shavazi et al., 2009): it brought better pedagogy and wellness care, 2 essential ingredients for birth control.

Brasil was too one of the countries with very high fertility in the 1950's – higher than the Congo, for example. The subtract started earlier than in Iran but happened more gradually. Today both countries take the aforementioned total fertility, beneath the replacement level.

Child mortality, education and family planning

Which factors cause the average number of children to go downwards? The literature apropos explanations for the subtract in fertility is vast and complex, but ii factors emerge as crucial in this process: didactics and kid survival.

Considering child survival kickoff: countries combining intensive nativity command with very high child mortality are simply non-real. The statistical association between the level of child mortality and fertility is very tight and strong: in countries with high kid mortality, fertility is high, and vice versa. This statistical correlation is very stiff because the causal relation goes in both directions; with quick succession of children and therefore a lot of children to accept care for, the chances of survival for the infants are lower than in those families with only a limited number of children to have care of – this is a fortiori the instance where infrastructure for health care is lacking. A high fertility level thus contributes to a high child mortality. And in the other direction: where survival chances of children improve, the fertility will go down because even those households with a lower number of children accept increasing conviction in having descendants in the long term.

It is crucial to understand that the decline in child mortality in the demographic transition ever precedes the decline in fertility. Men, women and families cannot be convinced of the benefits of birth control if they don't have confidence in the survival chances of their children. Better health intendance is therefore essential, and a lack of good health intendance is one of the reasons for a persistently high fertility in a state similar Niger.

Education is another factor that tin cause a refuse in fertility. This is probably the about important factor, not just because education is an important humanitarian goal in itself (apart from the demographic effects), but also considering with instruction one tin impale 2 birds with 1 stone: education causes more birth control merely also better child survival (recently clearly demonstrated by Smith-Greenaway (2013), which in its plow volition lead to better birth control. The statistical correlation between level of didactics and level of fertility is therefore very potent.

Firstly, education enhances the motivation for nascency control: if parents invest in the educational activity of their children, they volition accept fewer children, equally has been demonstrated. Secondly, didactics promotes a more than forwards-looking lifestyle: it will lead people to recollect on a somewhat longer term, to call up about tomorrow, adjacent week and next month, instead of living for the day. This attitude is necessary for effective birth control. Thirdly, educational activity also increases the potential for effective contraception, because nascence control doesn't only happen, especially non when efficient family unit planning facilities are not or hardly accessible or when there are opposing cultural or family unit values.

The influence of education on birth control has been demonstrated in a vast number of studies (James et al., 2022). It starts with chief education, only an fifty-fifty larger effect can exist attained past investment in secondary teaching (Cohen, 2008). In a country like Niger, for example, women who didn't finish chief school take on average 7.8 children. Women who did stop primary school have on boilerplate 6.seven children, while women who finished secondary school "simply" accept 4.half dozen children (Fig. 6). The fertility of Niger would exist a lot lower if more women could benefit from instruction. The tragedy of that country is that also many people fall in the category of those without a caste of primary school, with all its demographic consequences.

Association betwixt level of teaching and full fertility rate in some poor countries.

1 achieves with education therefore a plural beneficial demographic effect on top of the of import objective of homo emancipation in itself. All this is of course not always true but depends on which course of "educational activity"; I assume that we're talking almost education that teaches people the noesis and skills to meliorate accept control of their own destiny.

It is ane affair to get people motivated to practice birth control but obtaining actual effective contraception is quite some other affair. Information concerning the efficient use of contraceptives and increasing the accessibility and affordability of contraceptives tin therefore play an of import role. In that location are an estimated 215 meg women who would want to have contraception merely don't have the means (UNFPA, 2022). Investments in services to help with family unit planning are absolutely necessary and could already take keen results in this group of women. But it's no use to put the cart before the horse: if in that location is no intention to exercise nascence control, propaganda for and accessibility of contraception volition hardly have whatsoever effect, as was demonstrated in the past. In Europe the lion'south share of the decline in fertility was realized with traditional methods, before the introduction of hormonal contraception in the sixties. At that place is ofttimes a problem of lack of motivation for birth control on the one paw, as a effect of high child mortality and low schooling rates, and a lack of ability in women who may exist motivated to limit fertility but are confronted with male resistance on the other (Blanc, 2022; Do and Kurimoto, 2022). Empowerment of women is therefore essential, and pedagogy can play an of import part in that process as well.

Population momentum

Fifty-fifty if all the people would suddenly practise birth control much more than is currently considered possible, the world population would nevertheless continue to grow for a while. This is the upshot of population momentum, a notion that refers to the phenomenon of demographic inertia, comparable to the phenomenon of momentum and inertia in the field of physics. Demographic growth is like a moving train: even when you turn off the engine, the motility will go along for a little while.

The power and direction of population momentum is dependent on the age structure of the population. Compare the population pyramids of Arab republic of egypt and Federal republic of germany (Fig. vii). The ane for Egypt has a pyramidal shape indeed, merely the one for Deutschland looks more similar an onion. As a upshot of high birth rates in the previous decades, the largest groups of Egyptians are to be found below the age of forty; the younger, the more voluminous the generation. Even if the current and future generations of Egyptians would limit their fertility strongly (equally is indeed the case), the nascency charge per unit in Arab republic of egypt would still continue to rise for quite some time, just because year later year more and more potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages. Egypt therefore clearly has a growth momentum.

Population pyramids of Egypt (left) and Germany (correct).

Frg on the other mitt has a negative or shrinking momentum: even if the younger generations of Germans would have a larger num ber of children than the generation of their ain parents, the nascency rate in Frg would still continue to decrease because fewer and fewer potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages.

The population momentum on a global scale is positive: fifty-fifty if fertility would subtract overnight to the replacement level, the globe population would continue to grow with forty% (from 7 billion to 9.8 billion). Only the rich countries have a shrinking momentum, that is -three%. For Europe the momentum is -7%. The population momentum for the poorest countries in the world is +44%, that of Sub Saharan Africa +46% (Espenshade et al., 2022).

Consequences of the population explosion

The concerns about the consequences of population explosion started in the sixties. Milestone publications were the 1968 volume The Population bomb past biologist Paul Ehrlich, the written report of the Club of Rome from 1972 (The Limits to Growth) and the kickoff World Population Programme of Activity of the UN in 1974 among others.

In the world population debate, the full general concerns involve mainly three interconnected consequences of the population explosion: i) the growing poverty in the world and famine; ii) the exhaustion and pollution of natural resources essential to human survival; and iii) the migration pressure from the poor S to the rich Due north (Van Bavel, 2004).

Poverty and famine

The Malthusian line of thought continues to leave an important mark on the debate regarding the association betwixt population growth and poverty: Malthus saw an excessive population growth every bit an important cause of poverty and famine. Rightfully this Malthusian vision has been criticized a lot. One must after all take the reverse causal relation into account besides: poverty and the related social circumstances (similar a lack of educational activity and good wellness care for children) contribute to high population growth as well.

Concerning famine: the production of food has grown faster since 1960 than the world population has, and so nowadays the amount of food produced per person exceeds that which existed before the population explosion (Lam, 2022). The trouble of dearth isn't every bit much an insufficient nutrient production equally it is a lack of fair distribution (and a lack of sustainable production, but that'southward another consequence). Ofttimes regions with famine have ecological weather permitting sufficient production of food, provided the necessary investments in human resource and applied science are made. The virtually important crusade of famine is therefore not the population explosion. Dearth is primarily a result of unequal distribution of nutrient, which in plow is caused by social-economical inequality, lack of democracy and (civil) war.

Poverty and famine ordinarily have mainly political and institutional causes, not demographic ones. The Malthusian vision, that sees the population explosion as the root of all evil, therefore has to be corrected (Fig. 8). Rapid population growth can indeed hinder economical development and tin thus pave the way for poverty. Just this is merely role of the story. Every bit mentioned, poverty is likewise an underlying cause of rapid population growth. Social factors are at the base of operations of both poverty and population growth. It'due south those social factors that require our intervention: via investments in education and (reproductive) health care.

Connections between social factors, poverty and population growth.

Impact on the environment

The bear on of the population explosion on the surroundings is unquestionably loftier, but the size of the population represents just one aspect of this. In this regard information technology can be useful to keep in listen the simple I=PAT scheme: the ecological footprint or affect on the surround (I) can be regarded as the product of the size of the population (P), the prosperity or consumption level (A for affluence) and the technology used (T). The relationship betwixt each of these factors is more complex than the I=PAT scheme suggests, merely in whatsoever example the footprint I of a population of chiliad people is for instance dependent on how many of those people drive a car instead of a bike, and of the emission per auto of the vehicle armada concerned.

The ecological footprint of the world population has increased tremendously the past decades and the growth of the globe population has obviously played an important role in this. The other factors in the I=PAT scheme accept however played a relatively bigger role than the demographic factor P. The considerable increment in the Chinese ecological footprint of the past decades for example, is more a consequence of the increased consumption of meat than of population growth (Peters et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2008). The carbon dioxide emission of China grew by 82% between 1990 and 2003, while the population only increased by xi% in that same period. A similar story exists for Republic of india: the population grew by less than 23% between 1990 and 2003, while the emission of carbon dioxide increased by more than 83% (Chakravarty et al., 2009). The consumption of h2o and meat in the world is increasing more apace than the population³. The consumption of h2o per person is for example threefold higher in the US than in China (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). The African continent has at nowadays the aforementioned number of inhabitants every bit Europe and Northward America together, over 1 billion. But the full ecological footprint of Europeans and Americans is many times higher than that of Africans (Ewing et al., 2022). Less than xviii% of the world population is responsible for over 50% of the global carbon dioxide emission (Chakravarty et al., 2009).

If we are therefore concerned about the impact of the world population on the environment, we can practice something about it immediately by tackling our own overconsumption: it's something nosotros tin control and it has an immediate event. In contrast, we know of the population growth that information technology will continue for some time anyhow, fifty-fifty if people in poor countries would practice much more birth command than we consider possible at present.

Migration

The population explosion has created an increasing migration pressure from the Due south to the North – and there is also of import migration within and between countries in the Due south. Just here also the message is: the main responsibility doesn't lie with the population growth but with economical inequality. The chief motive for migration was and is economical disparity: people migrate from regions with no or badly paid labour and a low standard of living to other regions, where one hopes to find work and a college standard of living (Massey et al., 1993; Hooghe et al., 2008; IMO, 2022). Given the permanent population growth and economic inequality, a further increasing migration pressure is to be expected, irrespective of the national policies adopted.

It is sometimes expected that economic growth and increasing incomes in the South will slow downward the migration pressure, but that remains to be seen. After all, information technology isn't ordinarily the poorest citizens in developing countries that drift to rich countries. It is rather the affluent centre class in poor countries that have the ways to transport their sons and daughters to the North – an investment that can raise a lot of money via remittances to the families in the country of origin (IMO, 2022). There is later on all a considerable cost attached to migration, in terms of coin and human capital letter. Not everyone can behave those costs: to migrate you need brains, guts and money. With growing economical development in poor countries, an initial increase in migration force per unit area from those countries would be expected; the association between social-economic development and emigration is not linearly negative but follows the shape of a J turned upside downwardly: more emigration at the start of economic evolution and a refuse in emigration just with further evolution (De Haas, 2007).

7 Billion and counting… What is to be done?

A world population that needed some millennia earlier reaching the number of 1 billion people, but then added some billions more later on 1920 in less than a century: the social, cultural, economic and ecological consequences of such an evolution are and then complex that they tin can lead to fear and indifference at the same fourth dimension. What kind of constructive reaction is possible and productive in view of such an enormous outcome?

First of all: we need to invest in education and health care in Africa and elsewhere, non simply every bit a humanitarian target per se but besides considering it will encourage the spread of birth control. Secondly, we demand to encourage and support the empowerment of women, not just via education just also via services for reproductive health. This has triple desirable results for demographics: it will lead to more and more effective birth control, which in itself has a positive result on the survival of children, which in turn again facilitates nascence control.

Thirdly: because of the positive population momentum, the world population will certainly continue to grow in absolute figures, even though the yearly growth charge per unit in percentages is already on the decline for several years. The biggest contribution we could make therefore, with an immediate favourable impact for ourselves and the residual of the world, is to change our consumption design and bargain with the structural overconsumption of the globe'southward richest countries.

Footnotes

⁽¹⁾Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this paragraph are based on the United Nations Globe Population Prospects, the 2022 Revision, http://esa.united nations.org/wpp/. Apropos projections for the future, I reported the results of the Medium Variant. Apart from this variant, in that location are besides high and low variants (those relying on scenarios implying respectively an extremely high and extremely low growth of the population) and a variant in which the fertility rates are stock-still at the current levels. It is expected that the bodily number volition exist somewhere between the highest and lowest variant and will be closest to the medium variant. That's why I only report this latter value.

⁽²⁾In demography, the term «fertility» refers to the actual number of alive births per women. Past contrast, the term fecundity refers to reproductive capacity (irrespective of bodily childbearing), see Habbema et al. (2004).

^(three)See http://www.unwater.org/water-cooperation-2013/h2o-cooperation/facts-and-figures

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3987379/

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